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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16372

ROGER ANDERSON and THOMAS E.
BRACKENBURY,
Defendants-Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Respondent agrees with appellant Anderson's statement
of the facts contained in the introduction of his brief on
rehearing excluding the final paragraph of said introduction
at page 2 of his brief.
POINT I
ADMISSION OF THE SWORN AFFIDAVIT OF A
WITNESS NOT PRESENT AT THE PRELIMINARY
HEARING WAS HARMLESS ERROR.
At the appellant's preliminary hearing, the State
submitted as evidence the sworn affidavit of Ray Applegate,
a witness residing in Oklahoma.

The court admitted this

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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evidence under the provisions of Utah Code Ann.

§

77-15-19

(1953), as amended which allows the admission of hearsay
evidence "if the Court determines that it would impose an
unreasonable burden on one of the parties or on a witness
to require that the primary source of the evidence be product
at the hearing
This court found that admission of the hearsay
evidence was error since it "would seriously curtail the
appellant's ability to present an affirmative defense at the
preliminary hearing by denying him the protections provided
by the confrontation of witnesses against him."
opinion, p.11).

(Majority

However, this court concluded that any error

was harmless since the remaining evidence was sufficient to
show probable cause to bind the appellant over for trial.
(Majority opinion, p.12).
Respondent submits that this court's finding that
any error in admitting the affidavit was harmless should be
affirmed for the following reasons:
A

ANY ERROR IN ADMITTING
THE AFFIDAVIT WAS HARMLESS
SINCE THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT
SHOWING OF PROBABLE CAUSE
WITHOUT THE EVIDENCE CONTAINED
IN THE AFFIDAVIT.
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to establi'
probable cause to bind over the accused for trial.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Thus, t.r·

State's burden at the hearing is "to convince a committing
magistrate that the crime charged has been committed and
that there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant
committed it."

Seibold v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 165, 435 P.2d

289, 290-1 (1967).

Recognizing the limited purpose of the

preliminary hearing, this court noted that "the probable
cause showing must establish a prima facie case against the
defendant from which the trier of fact could conclude the
defendant was guilty of the offense charged."
opinion p.6).

(Majority

In order to establish a prima facie case,

the State must present evidence on each statutory element of
the offense charged.

State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 217

(Utah 1976).
The appellant was charged with witness tampering
under the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
as amended.

§

76-8-508 (1953),

This section reads, in part:

A person is guilty of a felony of the third
degree if:
(1) Believing that an official proceeding or
investigation is pending or about to be
instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person to:
(a)

Testify or inform falsely.

The respondent submits that all statutory elements
of the crime of witness tampering were established by prima
facie evidence at the preliminary hearing.

First, the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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testimony presented at the preliminary hearing showed that
the appellant believed an official proceeding or
was pending.

investigatio~

Irvine J. Curtis, a former police officer for

Soldier Summit, stated that he arrested Jim Garner at the
request of appellant (Preliminary Hearing Transcript, p.37).
Furthermore, appellant's position as Chief of Police of
Soldier Summit would necessarily make him aware of any
proceedings being instituted.

The seconde element of the

offense, attempting to induce or cause another person to
testify falsely, is also established by the Curtis testimony.
Curtis recounted two conversations with appellant and Tom
Brackenbury in which they discussed the method used to
obtain a statement from Ray Applegate to the effect that
Garner had sold him liquor over the bar.
Hearing Transcript, p. 38-39).

(Preliminary

The testimony concerning the

first of these conversations reads, in relevant part:
. He said, "I got a statement of him
[Garner] selling alcohol over the bar,"
and I said, "How did you get that?" He
said, "Well, I got it from Applegate, a
truck driver, a drunk truck driver." He
made the statement that he slapped him
around real good, bragging about the fact
that he had slapped him around to get the
statement.
(Preliminary Hearing
Transcript p.38).
This testimony clearly established that the appellant attemp~'
to obtain and succeeded in obtaining statements from Ray ApF~'
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1

through force.

The final element of the crime is the

falsity of the statements obtained from the witness.
Evidence of falsity is shown by a comparison of the
testimony of Jim Garner at the preliminary hearing as
to what happened in the J & M Saloon on May 28, 1978
and the statement of Ray Applegate concerning the events
of the same evening.

(States Exhibit #1).

Garner testified

that Applegate did not purchase liquor from him (Preliminary
Hearing Transcript p.49) nor did he purchase liquor from
his wife for fifty cents a shot.
Transcript pp. 50, 53).

(Preliminary Hearing

However, in the statement made by

Applegate and witnessed by the appellant, Justice of the
Peace Tom Brackenbury and Mayor George Schade, Applegate
claims to have purchased alcohol from Garner and his wife
at fifty cents a shot.

Respondent submits that the testimony

of these witnesses in conjunction with the false statements
made by Applegate was sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of witness tampering and establish sufficient cause
to believe appellant committed the offense charged.
The appellant argues that the false statements
made by Applegate cannot be considered in determining probable
cause since the foundation for admission of these statements
~as

the hearsay affidavit determined to be inadmissible by

this court.

Respondent contends that the appellant should
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not be allowed to raise this objection for the first time
in his petition for rehearing.

The admission of these

documents was not specifically objected to when they were
offered at the preliminary hearing nor at any time since.
It is a well-established principle that failure to raise
a timely objection constitutes a waiver and estops a party
from raising the objection for the first time on appeal.
Sanders v. Cassity, 586 P.2d 423 (Utah 1978).
The respondent asserts that the evidence presented
at the preliminary hearing was sufficient, notwithstanding
the exclusion of the hearsay evidence, to fulfill the State's
burden of showing probable cause.

Respondent further claims

that since the state fulfilled its burden at the

prelimina~

hearing, no prejudicial error resulted from admission of
the hearsay evidence.
B

THE ADMISSION OF THE
AFFIDAVIT WAS HARMLESS ERROR,
SINCE THERE WAS NO REASONABLE
LIKELIHOOD THAT THE RESULT
WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT IF
THIS EVIDENCE HAD BEEN EXCLUDED.
The standard of review for prejudicial error
established by Utah case law is a determination whether the~ ·
is a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been
different in the absence of error.

A concise statement of

this principle appeared in State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114
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(Utah 1977) where this court stated:
. . the rule which we have numerous
times stated is that if the error is
such as to justify a belief that it
had a substantial adverse effect upon
the defendant's right to a fair trial,
in that there is a reasonable likelihood
that in its absence there may have been
a different result, then the error should
not be regarded as harmless; and conversely,
if the error is such that it is clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that it was
harmless in that the result would have
been the same, then the error should not
be deemed prejudicial . .
569 P.2d at 1116.

See also, State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949

(Utah 1975); State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466 (Utah 1975).
Any error in admitting the affidavit of Ray Applegate
in lieu of his personal testimony at the preliminary hearing
was harmless under this test since there is no likelihood
of a different result in absence of the error.

First,

sufficient cause to bind the appellant over for trial was
shown by evidence not contained in the affidavit.

Second,

if the affidavit had not been admitted, probable cause would
have been established by the personal testimony of the
witness.

Accordingly, the court made provisions at the

preliminary hearing that, should the affidavit be determined
to be inadmissible, the proceeding would be continued until
Applegate could testify in person.
Transcript p.17).

(Preliminary Hearing

In absence of such a provision, the State

could have refiled charges if exclusion of the affidavit
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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resulted in a determination that probable cause was not
shown.

Therefore, respondent submits that there is no

reasonable likelihood of a different result in absence of
error, since if the affidavit had not been admitted, the
State would have made arrangements, at considerable expense,
to have Applegate present at the preliminary hearing.
The appellant further contends that since he
was not able to cross-examine the witness at the

prelimina~

hearing, he was denied discovery opportunities which
hindered his ability to prepare a meaningful defense.
(Appellant's Brief, p.6).

Respondent wishes to point out

that this argument must be placed in the proper perspective.
Recognizing the right of the accused to confront witnesses
at the preliminary hearing does not create a right to
discovery at the preliminary hearing.
188 Ariz. 100, 574 P.2d 1319

See, State v. Prevost,

(1977); Rex v. Sullivan, 575

P.2d 408 (Colo. 1978); McDonald v. Dist. Court In and For
Fourth Judicial District, 576 P.2d 169 (Colo. 1978); ~
v. United States, 476 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1973).

The

disc~c

opportunity afforded the appellant at the preliminary hear~
is in issue only as it relates to appellant's right to a
fair trial, and the majority opinion does not support an
independent right to discovery at the preliminary hearing.
(Majority opinion p.11).

On the contrary, the opinion
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recognizes that discovery opportunities are "ancillary
benefits" of the preliminary proceeding.
p.11).

(Majority opinion

Thus, Justice Maughn clearly delineated the scope

of the right of confrontation:
recognition of the right of
confrontation at the preliminary
examination does not change the
character of that proceeding.
It
must still retain its preliminary
nature and is not to be considered
a full trial on the merits.
The
prosecution is not required to
introduce its entire case at the
hearing but, rather, need only
introduce that quantum of evidence
necessary to surmount their burden
of proving probable cause. The
recognition of the right of confrontation at the preliminary
hearing merely demands the prosecution's use of hearsay evidence
at the hearing may not circumvent
the defendant's substantive rights
to a fair hearing and fair trial, by
denying the defendant an opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses who
offer testimony at the hearing.
(Majority opinion, p.12).
The respondent asserts that no "right to discovery"
was denied appellant by introduction of the sworn affidavit
at the hearing.

The opportunity for discovery is merely a

benefit incidental to the limited right of confrontation in
the preliminary hearing.

The State sustained its only burden

at the hearing by presenting sufficient evidence in addition
to the affidavit to establish probable cause to bind the
appellant over for trial.

Furthermore, every effort was
-9-
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made to ensure that the fact Ray Applegate did not personall;
testify would have only a minimal effect on the defendant.
Accordingly, the magistrate accepted the State's motion to
admit the hearsay evidence pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-15-_i

(1953), as amended, with the understanding that if the motior.
were denied, and the hearsay not admitted, the preliminary
hearing would be continued until the witness could be present.
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript, p.17).

In addition, the

Court made arrangements with the prosecutor on the record
I

to have Applegate available one day prior to trial.
Hearing Transcript, p. 19) .

(Prelimi'::

The appellant's ability to prepare I
I

a meaningful defense was not hindered by the admission of
this hearsay evidence to the extent that his right to a fair
trial was affected.

Thus, respondent submits that there is

no likelihood that, in absence of any error in admitting
this evidence, the result of the preliminary hearing or trial
would have been any different.
Appellant cites the cases of Chapman v. California,
386 u.s. 18, 87 s.ct. 824, 17 L.Ed 2d 705
Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 P.2d 639

(1967) and State

(1970)

in support

1'·'

of

the contention that before a constitutional error can be
held harmless, it must be proven to be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Respondent submits that these cases do

not assert a standard for determining error any more strin~:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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than the "reasonable likelihood of a different result"
test well established in the Utah case law discussed supra.
Chapman treated the effect of highly prejudicial comments
by opposing counsel in the presence of the jury concerning
the accused's failure to testify.

The appellant creates

the impression that the Court in that case placed the
burden of proving an error to be non-prejudicial upon the
State when, in fact, the Supreme Court merely held that
. before a federal constitutional error can be held
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."

386 U.S. at 24.

Respondent submits that finding an error harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt and concluding that there is no reasonable
likelihood that, in the absence of error, the result would
be different are converse statements of the same standard.
Accordingly, this court has often expressed the standard in
the alternative,as in the following language from State v.
Howard, 544 P.2d 466 (Utah 1975):
. . if upon looking at the whole
evidence, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no
substantial likelihood that the
verdict would have been different
in the absence of the error, it
should be disregarded. But the
reverse proposition is also true:
that if there is a reasonable
likelihood that in the absence of
the error, there would have been a
different result, the error should
be regarded as prejudicial.
(Emphasis
added).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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554 P.2d at 469.

See also State v. Eaton, supra.

The Scandrett case, similarly, merely re-states
the standard for reversible error established in Utah
case law and does not place a burden upon the State to
show each and every error to be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

This Court in Scandrett rejected the

view that any violation of a constitutional right is
prejudicial per se, concluding that although "there
is a presumption that such error is prejudicial," "it can be
overcome when the court is convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that it had no such prejudicial effect upon the
proceedings."

(Emphasis added.)

468 P.2d at 643.

Responden:~

points out that the other cases cited by appellant as support:·
its depiction of the test for harmless error also re-state
the "reasonable likelihood" test.

Respondent has already

shown that any error in the present case is harmless under
this standard since there is no reasonable likelihood that,
had the hearsay evidence been excluded, the result at the
hearing or the trial would have been any different and,
conversely, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error could have no prejudicial effect upon the appellant's
right to a fair trial.
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POINT II
THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE ADMISSION OF HEARSAY
EVIDENCE AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
CONSTITUTED ERROR.
Respondent respectfully urges this court to
reconsider its conclusion on appeal that the introduction
of hearsay evidence at the preliminary hearing was constitutional error.

Respondent submits that it was unnecessary

to implicate the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann.

§

77-15-19 or to hold that an accused has a constitutional
right to confront every material witness who is the source
of evidence offered at the preliminary hearing.
The United States Constitution does not give the
accused a right to a preliminary hearing.

See United States

ex rel Kassin v. Mulligan, 295 U.S. 396, 53 S.Ct. 781, 79
L.Ed. 1501 (1935); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 82 S.Ct.
955, 8 L.Ed.2d 98

(1962).

However, the Supreme Court has

held certain Sixth Amendment rights must be guaranteed to
an accused before trial at critical stages in the process of
criminal prosecution.
845, 43 L.Ed.2d 54

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct.

(1975); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1,

90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1969).

The Supreme Court

"has identified as 'critical stages' those pretrial procedures
that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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required to proceed without counsel."
supra, 420 U.S. at 122.

Gerstein v. Pugh,

Hence, the Fourth Amendment

determination of probable cause to detain an individual,
the situation in Gerstein, was not a critical stage
requiring assistanceof counsel, while the determination
of probable cause to bind an accused over for trial, the
situation in Coleman, was a critical stage of the proceeding
requiring assistance of counsel.

Although both cases

involved a determination of "probable cause," the procedural
safeguards differ.

Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843,

2 9 8 N. E. 2d 819 , 8 2 3, 8 2 4 ( 19 7 3) .
These Supreme Court cases rest upon an analysis
of the various stages of the criminal proceeding to determine '
when Sixth Amendment rights must be protected against possible
prejudice.

However, the Supreme Court has always made an

effort to balance the accused's interest against the State's
interest at each stage of the process.

Gerstein v. Pugh,

cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33
L.Ed. 2d 484

(1972)

("[I] t

is a recognition that not all

situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the
same kind of procedure."

400 U.S. at 481).

The Supreme Court has yet to hold that the Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation is absolutely applicable
to any criminal proceeding other than the actual trial.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"The right to confrontation is basically a trial right."
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).

Thus far, the

Supreme Court has determined that the right to effective
assistance of counsel, the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses testifying at the hearing and the right
of the defense to call its own witnesses are sufficient to
protect the accused's right to a fair trial in critical
pre-trial proceedings.
It is only at the trial stage, where accused's
guilt or innocence is determined, that the Court has
granted the accused the right to confront all witnesses
presenting evidence.

As the Supreme Court observed in

Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 89 S.Ct. 540, 21 L.Ed.2d
500

(1969), one of the objectives of the right to confrontation

at trial is to guarantee that the ultimate fact finder who
determines guilt or innocence has an adequate opportunity
to assess the credibility of witnesses.

This is echoed by

other courts, eg., Haggard v. State, 475 S.W.2d 186, 187
(Tenn. 1971), "The 'confrontation' guaranteed by the United
States Constitution is confrontation at trial.

[Absence of

the accused when a statement is made] is immaterial on a
confrontation question so long as the [witness] can be crossexamined on the witness stand at trial."

Where an accused

can confront and cross-examine a witness at trial, "there is

-15-
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no Sixth Amendment requirement that [the accused) also be
allowed to confront [the witness) at a preliminary hearing
prior to trial."

United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670,

677 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 888, 93 S.Ct. 195,
34 L.Ed. 2d 145 (1972).
The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to
determine whether there is "probable cause" to bind the
accused over for trial.

Thus, the function of a preliminary
Ut~

hearing is similar to that of a grand jury proceeding.

Code Ann. § 77-18-1 et seq., and Utah Code Ann. § 77-19-1
et seq.

Yet an accused at a grand jury proceeding has no

right even to be present (unless called as a witness),
Johnson v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 539 P.2d
792 (Calif. 1975), and no right to cross-examine or confront
witnesses against him.

People v. Encinas, 3 Cal. Rptr. 624,

186 C.A.2d 12 (1960); see State v. Salazar, 469 P.2d 157
(N.M. 1970).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-19-3 provides that a witnes;

testifying before a grand jury has the right to counsel and
the right not to incriminate himself, but the statute does
not provide for confrontation and cross-examination of

i

witnesses.

I

At the preliminary hearing the accused has the sarrE
rights regarding counsel and self-incrimination.

However,

the accused has additional rights to be present when a
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wit~'

I

testifies and to cross-examine the witness, Utah Code Ann.
§

77-15-10; to present his own witnesses, Utah Code Ann.

§

77-15-11; supoenaed at his request, Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-11;

and to require exclusion of persons from the proceeding,
unless their presence is required by statute, Utah Code Ann.
§

77-15-13.

An additional safeguard inherent in the nature

of the preliminary hearing is the requirement that the
hearing take place before a magistrate rather than a jury
of lay persons.
The accused's rights are further protected by the
fact that the preliminary hearing is governed by the rules
of evidence for criminal cases.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-19(2).

The only exception to the evidence rules is that hearsay
may be admitted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-19.
However, this statute provides that hearsay may be used at
the preliminary hearing only in the following circumstances:
(2)
. if the court determines that it
would impose an unreasonable burden on one
of the parties or on a witness to require
that the primary source of the evidence
be produced at the hearing, and if the
witness or party furnishes information
bearing on the informant's reliability
and, as far as possible, the means by
which the information was obtained.
When
hearsay evidence is admitted, the court,
in determining the existence of sufficient
cause, shall consider:
(a)
The extent to which the hearsay quality
of the evidence affects the weight it should
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be given, and
(b)
The likelihood of evidence other
than hearsay being available at trial
to provide the information furnished
by hearsay at the preliminary examination.
The use of hearsay at the preliminary hearing is thus severe:
limited, requiring the magistrate to make several threshold
determinations before admitting the evidence.
As this court noted, "Only when the specific
safeguard is necessary to effectuate the protection of a
substantive right held by the accused will its application
to the specific criminal proceeding be mandated."
opinion, p. 5).

(Majority

Respondent submits that this Court's holding

requiring confrontation of material witnesses presenting
evidence at a preliminary hearing is not necessary to
the accused's right to a fair trial.

pro~ct

An accused's rights

and interests are sufficiently protected by the assistance
of counsel and the procedural safeguards in the preliminacy
hearing as noted above.

The accused is not prevented from

confronting witnesses if hearsay evidence is admitted since
the accused himself may supeona the witness pursuant to Ut~
Code Ann. § 77-15-8.

Furthermore, if the witness is not

present at the preliminary hearing, the accused has the
right to confront the witness at trial before the jury.
Since the primary purpose of a preliminary hear~:
is to determine if there is probable cause to bind the ace'
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over for trial, respondent contends that Utah Code Ann.
§

77-15-19 is well drafted and should not be limited in

its application by requiring confrontation of all material
witnesses.

The statute authorizes the use of hearsay only

if production of the primary source of evidence would be
an unreasonable burden on a party or a witness.

The court

is also required to make several other threshold determinations,
as noted above, before admitting the hearsay.

The use of

hearsay evidence in these limited circumstances does not
infringe upon an accused's right to a fair trial.

The

safeguards already existing in the criminal process are
sufficient to protect this right without requiring confrontation of all witnesses at the preliminary hearing.
POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM ITS FINDINGS
THAT APPELLANTS OTHER ARGUMENTS IN HIS
INITIAL BRIEF ON APPEAL ARE WITHOUT
MERIT.
This court stated in the majority opinion that after
consideration of appellant's other points on appeal, these
points were found to be without merit.

Respondent submits

that this court's initial determination was correct and
should not be disturbed.

Respondent hereby incorporates by

reference the arguments in opposition to appellant's contentions
presented in respondent's initial brief on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the recent decision by
this court in State v. Anderson and Brackenbury, No. 16372,
filed May 29, 1980, was correct and that a rehearing is not
merited.

Respondent prays that the present petition for

rehearing be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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